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In truth, literature, in science and in art, there are, and can be, few, if any,
things which in an abstract sense are strictly new and original throughout.
Every book in literature, science, and art borrows, and must necessarily
1
borrow, and use much which was well known and used before.
-Joseph Story

I. Introduction
With the rise of online blogging, social networking platforms, and
video-sharing sites such as YouTube and Yahoo Video, it is now
∗

Professor & Public Interest Fellow, Small Business & Nonprofit Clinic, Michigan State
University College of Law. Michigan State University College of Law (L.L.M./M.J.,
Intellectual Property, 2012). The author would like to thank Barry and Dr. Maryann
Kinsey for their support.
1. Emerson v. Davies, 8 F. Cas. 615, 619 (C.C.D. Mass. 1845) (No. 4436).
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possible for one individual to rival the span of entire media empires
from one’s basement computer. Commonly known as the Web 2.0
phenomenon, the combination of these technological advancements
with video platforms that encourage users to “engage, create, and
2
share content online” has fundamentally transformed the music
industry. No longer are fans passive listeners, but instead, with the
click of a mouse and access to the Internet, they become
“publisher[s], TV network[s], radio station[s], movie studio[s], record
3
label[s], and newspaper[s], all wrapped into one.”
This article evaluates the current liability of Mashup Artists, those
whom are, for purposes of this article, “individuals who develop video
or audio works comprised of two or more segments of pre-existing
copyrighted material for personal use, distribution on the Internet, or
4
profit.” As the Mashup Artist’s creation is often neither entirely the
product of his own creativity, nor distributed online with the original
copyright holder’s permission, he may automatically be deemed a
copyright infringer when publishing his work. Thus, he is only able to
5
seek refuge under the fair use doctrine, a four-factor analysis
6
described by critics as “a risky proposition” and “an impediment
to . . . profitable return on digital, remixed creative labor.”
In recognizing that moral rights 7 concerns are outweighed by the
overwhelming need to develop new methods to better accommodate
the evolving needs of the Mashup Artist and ensure protection to the
original copyright holder in this digital age, copyright theorists have
established several alternative methods to fair use. To satisfy the
intricate balance between sampling and stealing without inhibiting the
First Amendment goals and historical aims of copyright law, these
theorists suggest measures such as establishing a compulsory licensing
2. Edward Lee, Developing Copyright Practices for User-Generated Content, 13 J.
INTERNET L. 1, 1 (2009).
3. Id. at 13.
4. I refer to the works created by Mashup Artists as either “Mashup” or “Mashups.”
5. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
6. Michael Katz, Recycling Copyright: Survival and Growth in the Remix Age, Univ.
S.F.
From
the
Selected
Works
of
Michael
Katz
(Oct.
2008)
http://works.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1001&context=michael_katz (“The
distinction between fair use and infringement isn’t easily defined, as the Copyright Office
puts it.”).
7. Although not recognized within the Copyright Act, an Artist’s “moral rights”
generally consist of the right to “create a work, to display the work to the public in
whatever form he or she chooses, to withhold the creation from the public, and to demand
respect for his or her personality as the creator of a work.” Martin A. Roeder, The
Doctrine of Moral Right: A Study in the Law of Artist, Authors and Creators, 53 HARV. L.
REV. 554, 578 (1940).
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system, relaxing market economic structure, or using a sound
recording collective. Theorists also recommend reverting to contract
law principles and allowing individual recording labels or production
studios to develop their own regulations should a Mashup Artist wish
to use their copyrighted works in his creation.
The purpose of this article is to advocate for the restructuring of
current copyright law to impose heightened requirements on social
and video-sharing networks and include a four-tiered matrix
exclusively designed to assess copyright issues relating to Mashups.
Not only is this matrix consistent with the constitutionally mandated
policy goal of the Copyright Act to promote “the [p]rogress of
8
[s]cience and useful [a]rts,” but it also eliminates the arbitrariness
inherent in the current fair use doctrine, and provides Mashup Artists
with a level of clarity in how they may properly use copyrighted
works in their creation.
In making this recommendation, this article begins by elaborating
on the definition of “Mashup,” explaining the expanding role of the
Mashup Artist, and elaborating on the current conflict between
copyright holders and Mashup Artists. The article next examines the
fair use doctrine as it pertains to Mashups and summarizes why the
protection it affords Mashup Artists is insufficient and fails to
recognize the overwhelming public value Mashups impose on society.
The article then identifies alternative solutions proposed by copyright
theorists and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of each
recommended mechanism. It concludes by encouraging the United
States Copyright Office to impose heightened requirements on social
and video-sharing online networks and expand the Copyright Act to
include a four-tiered matrix that outlines the various requirements a
Mashup Artist must follow in order for his work to be immune from
infringement claims. Each tier of the matrix reflects a series of factors
particular to the created Mashup, including the location where it may
be found and whether it serves a commercial purpose. Based on
where a Mashup Artist’s creation falls, he may have no
responsibilities to the original copyright holder or may be forced to
pay a set fee that corresponds with the length and type of each
copyrighted work incorporated. In promoting this matrix as the ideal
mechanism to combat arbitrariness within the fair use doctrine, this
article elaborates on its strengths, refutes criticisms surrounding its
recommendation, and emphasizes how this mechanism is superior to
suggested alternatives.
8. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
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II. Defining the Mashup and its Role in the Entertainment
Industry
A. The Mashup

Absent from most dictionaries, the term “Mashup” has multiple
meanings depending on the context in which it is used. It may refer
to “a musical or audiovisual work that consists entirely of parts of
9
other songs or videos” or “an offspring of sampling that mixes
10
together two or more records to create a new song.”
As the definition of Mashup varies in form, so does the Mashup
itself, as it is incredibly flexible and its possibilities are endless. For
example, a Mashup may be developed for a commercial or noncommercial purpose, displayed privately on a home computer or
publicly through world-wide video-sharing sites such as Youtube and
Yahoo Video, and include two or two-hundred-thousand copyrighted
works at one or one-hundred minutes apiece, lasting thirty seconds or
thirty days in length. Because the Mashup lacks consistency in its
definition, it also may pertain to sculptures, paintings, video, audio or
audio-visual works. It also could include any combination of these art
forms.
For the purposes of this article, the Mashup is “any video or audio
work comprised of two or more segments of pre-existing copyrighted
material.” This article explicitly excludes tangible art forms from the
definition for two main reasons. First, absent the computer’s ability
to digitize visual artwork, it is frequently difficult, costly, and time
consuming to accurately and objectively measure the amount of
copyrighted material used in the creation of a painting, drawing or
sculpture. Second, because digital technology empowers users from
all backgrounds with all levels of ability to create music and videos
that can be disseminated world-wide through the use of the internet
in a cost-efficient, instantaneous manner, audio and video mashups
presently impose a greater threat to the original copyright holder’s
rights than visual art. This definition does not restrict future scholars
from expanding it to encompass visual artwork, but only mandates
that, for the purpose of this article, Mashups solely include video and
audio works.

9. James De Los Reyes, Examining Copyright Exemptions for Web Mashups in the
International Context: Applying American Constitutional Considerations as Guidepost for
the Trips Three-Step Test, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 473, 476 (2011).
10. Jeffrey Omari, The Digital Sampling of Music Has Stretched the Meaning of the
Fair Use Doctrine, L.A. LAWYER, Sept. 2010 at 35, 38.
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B. How Mashups Conflict with Copyright Holder Concerns

The United States Constitution grants Congress the power “to
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors . . . the exclusive Right to their . . .
Writings.” In conjunction with this authority, Congress, via section
11
106 of the 1976 Copyright Act (hereinafter, “Copyright Act”),
established six exclusive rights authors would automatically retain in
their original, copyrighted works. Included in these rights are the
12
rights to: (1) “reproduce the copyrighted work in copies,” (2)
13
“distribute copies . . . of the copyrighted work to the public . . . ,” (3)
14
“. . . perform the copyrighted work publicly,” (4) and “prepare
15
derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” It is the fourth
exclusive right mentioned, the right to prepare derivative works,
where the majority of contention lies between the Mashup Artist and
the original author or copyright holder.
Included within section 101 of the Copyright Act, 16 the term
‘derivative work’ is defined as “a work based upon one or more
preexisting works, such as a . . . musical arrangement . . . motion
picture version, sound recording . . . or any other form in which a
17
work may be recast . . . .” The overwhelming concern asserted by
copyright holders is that the Mashup Artist’s use of their copyrighted
material without seeking advance permission to do so infringes upon
their exclusive right under section 106 to create a derivative work
from that copyrighted material. This theory is predicated upon the
belief that Mashups are included within the definition of a derivative
work, and as such, when someone other than the original copyright
holder creates a Mashup, he has automatically infringed on the
copyright holder’s exclusive rights and must be held liable for this
18
infringement.
Courts are not easily persuaded by this argument, however, and
although they neglect to provide Mashup Artists with guidance as to
the “quantum of similarity . . . necessary to become liable for

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
Id. at § 106(1).
Id. at § 106(3).
Id. at § 106(4).
Id. at § 106 (2).
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2006).
Id.
Omari, supra note 10, at 35.
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infringement,” 19 they seldom find a Mashup Artist liable to the
original copyright holder solely on the basis that the Mashup may be
viewed as derivative, despite the fact that even “a very small amount
20
of expression [taken] from a copyrighted work” may result in
copyright infringement under the derivative works right. Instead,
even if the copyright holder argues the Mashup is a derivative work, a
Mashup Artist’s use of the copyrighted material may be considered
‘fair’ under 17 U.S.C. § 107, so long as it has a transformative, creative
purpose and adequately satisfies the four factors established within
21
the fair use doctrine.

III. The Fair Use Doctrine
A. Elements of Fair Use

With rapid growth in the technology utilized by Mashup Artists in
developing their creations, and an increase in the amount of
individuals beginning to combine copyrighted materials to create
22
‘new’ works, concerns surrounding compliance with copyright laws
have become increasingly pervasive, as Mashup Artists use
copyrighted material in a manner often not intended by the original
rights-holders. As a result of this unauthorized and unintended use,
should the Mashup Artist become threatened with an infringement
23
claim his only recourse is to seek refuge under the fair use doctrine,
a mechanism defined by the United States Supreme Court as “a
privilege in others than the owner of the copyright to use the
24
copyrighted material in a reasonable manner without his consent.”
Although designed to ensure the use of copyrighted materials by
those who have not received permission from the original copyright
holder is fair, the fair use doctrine—in practice and pertaining to
Mashups—is anything but. It is filled with multiple uncertainties

19. Naomi Abe Voegtli, Rethinking Derivative Rights, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 1213, 1220
(1997).
20. Id.
21. R. Anthony Reese, Transformativeness and the Derivative Work Right, 31
COLUM. J. L. & ARTS 467, 494 (2008).
22. Andrew S. Long, Mashed Up Videos and Broken Down Copyright: Changing
Copyright to Promote the First Amendment Values of the Transformative Video, 60 OKLA.
L. REV. 317 (2007) (“In 2004, over fifty-three million people, accounting for forty-four
percent of Internet users, uploaded user created data or videos onto the Internet.”).
23. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
24. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 549 (1985)
(quoting HORACE G. BALL, THE LAW OF COPYRIGHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260
(1944)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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resulting from the user’s ability to easily combine multiple
copyrighted works for international dissemination in the manner of
his choosing while incurring little, if any, financial expense during the
creative process.
Included within section 107 of the Copyright Act, the fair use
doctrine “permits courts to avoid rigid application of the copyright
statute when, on occasion, it would stifle the very creativity which
25
[the] law is designed to foster.” To determine whether a Mashup
Artist’s appropriation of the copyrighted material in his creation is
26
fair, courts must consider four factors. Each factor is individually
assessed and evaluated with flexibility and discretion.
The first factor requires courts to evaluate “the purpose and
character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial
27
nature or is for non-profit educational purposes.” The rationale
behind this factor is to determine if the newly created Mashup
threatens the market value of the original copyrighted material. It
also assesses the extent to which the Mashup transforms the original
work into something innovative and unique. Transformativeness,
generally defined by the fair use doctrine as including “something
new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first
with new expression, meaning, or message,” is imperative in
examining the liability of Mashup Artists under this factor, as “the
more transformative the new work, the less [significance the other
three factors will have, even if they] . . . weigh against a finding of fair
28
use.” In looking to whether a work is transformative, courts often
ask whether the Mashup could serve as a supplement to or
replacement for the original copyrighted work.
In determining whether Mashup Artists are likely to prevail under
this first factor, courts will consider the distribution of their work, i.e.,
whether the Mashup is purely for personal use, disseminated via
online video-sharing networks, or developed solely for a commercial
purpose. Courts will also review the message the Mashup presents,
looking to whether it is identical to that of the original copyright
holders, or whether it aggregates those copyrighted works to create a
new art form with an entirely original message.

25. Steward v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 236 (1990) (internal quotation marks and
citation omitted).
26. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (“the factors to be considered shall include . . . ”).
27. Id. at § 107(1).
28. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
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The problem with this factor of fair use, as it pertains to Mashups,
is that it is purely subjective and difficult for judges to determine the
degree to which a message may be altered so that it no longer violates
the copyright holder’s rights to the original work. With the broad
definition of transformativeness, the likelihood for arbitrariness is
rampant, since every Mashup Artist is likely to believe his or her
work is “something new,” and judges are presented with little
guidance in determining the amount of change a copyrighted work
must undergo before it may be deemed new. Further, this factor
lacks uniformity, as two separate Mashups that appear to transform
the original works in a like fashion may receive different treatment.
Moreover, because Mashups are often published via online videosharing networks, it is difficult for a court to determine the
commercial value of a Mashup. This is especially so if the Mashup
Artist does not directly profit from his work, as the majority of these
file-sharing networks generate profits from advertising based on the
success and popularity of the published Mashup.
Under the second factor, the fair use doctrine requires courts to
29
evaluate “the nature of the copyrighted work.” The purpose of this
element is to assess the originality of the copyrighted work used
within the Mashup and delve into whether it is an “original creative
30
expression,” or a mere “recitation of factual information,” since
mere facts alone are not eligible for protection under the Copyright
31
Act, and may be reproduced by the Mashup Artist in his creation.
As such, stronger protection under this factor is most often given to
fictional and highly creative works as opposed to mere ideas, facts,
32
formulas or processes. Under this prong, the court will also examine
whether the original copyright holder has previously exercised his
right to publish the copyrighted work. This element is particularly
important, as the original author traditionally retains a significant
interest in “controlling the circumstances of the first public revelation
33
34
of his work and his right, if he so chooses, not to publish at all.”
The preeminent concern with this factor is that it is outdated.
Although at the time the fair use doctrine was adopted it may have
29. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (2006).
30. Campbell, 510 U.S. at 586.
31. Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
32. Jon M. Garon, Fair Use Documentaries GALLAGHER, CALLAHAN, & GARTRELL
(Dec. 2009), http://www.gcglaw.com/resources/entertainment/fair_use.html.
33. Harper & Row, 471 U.S.at 552-55.
34. Pierre N. Leval, Toward a Fair Use Standard, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1118
(1990).
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been easy to determine the particular ‘nature’ of a copyrighted work,
or whether it had been published, due to the technological advances
surrounding the Web 2.0 phenomenon, present-day determination of
whether a work has been published is not as easily made. Today,
publication may include a video posted once on a family member’s
Facebook wall, a Mashup Artist’s private Myspace page, or a song
played for family and friends outside at a local park.
The third factor requires courts to examine “the amount and
substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work
35
as a whole.” This factor, like the first, considers the purpose and
character of the copyrighted material, but does so in a different
manner. Emphasis is placed upon the substantive elements of the
copyrighted work and the significance of the material taken from the
copyrighted work, instead of on the ultimate purpose behind the
copyrighted creation. In determining whether a fair use violation has
occurred under this element, the court must balance the quantity of
the copyrighted material appropriated by the Mashup Artist with the
36
“significance of the material taken from the copyrighted work.”
Quantity is not necessarily commensurate with duration under this
factor; a Mashup Artist’s use of an entire copyrighted work may not
oppose a finding of fair use, while the copying of a mere several
37
seconds may.
This factor does not provide adequate protection to Mashup
Artists, as it fails to impose a uniform way for judges to determine the
substantiality of a particular excerpt from a copyrighted work. As
audio-visual works often impose multiple messages at one time that
may be interpreted differently by each listener or viewer, it is
impossible for courts to apply this factor to Mashups in a uniform
fashion. The author of the copyrighted material may identify one
particular clip or series of chords as the substantial part of the
copyrighted work, while the consumer or Mashup Artist may render
that excerpt as mere surplus. Judges are often not musical composers
or television producers, and should not be forced to determine
something as subjective as identifying whether a particular section of
copyrighted material may be deemed significant to the copyrighted
work as a whole, particularly when the creative expression of the
Mashup Artist is at stake. Because of judicial discrepancy as to what
may classify as a ‘substantial’ portion of a copyrighted work, this third

35. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (2006).
36. Long, supra note 22, at 332.
37. Id.
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factor eliminates all elements of predictability within the fair use
doctrine, and leaves the Mashup Artist with no indication as to the
amount or type of appropriation that would constitute infringement.
The final factor has been described by the United States Supreme
Court as “undoubtedly the single most important element of fair
38
use” and requires courts to evaluate the effect the Mashup has
“upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work” as a
39
whole. In determining if this element has been met, courts look to
whether the Mashup usurps the market’s need for or serves as a
40
substitute to the copyrighted material. In rendering this decision,
the court evaluates not only the harm the Mashup imposes on the
copyrighted material, but also the harm that may be imposed on any
41
derivative works the copyright holder may produce at a later date.
Mashups that serve as a mere replacements for copyrighted material
frequently fail under this element, as their creation often involves
little creativity, and the Mashup Artist’s role becomes that of pirate
instead of creator. The justification for examining the Mashup’s
effect on the market is to ensure that the traditional aims of copyright
law are not ignored and that future artistry and creativity is not
42
stifled. To promote through the creation of new and innovative
works, courts apply this fourth factor to prevent copyright holders
from barring innovation, particularly on the basis of competition.
Copyright holders are unlikely to succeed in initiating an claim
against a Mashup Artist’s creation solely on the basis that the Mashup
43
may negatively affect the market value of the copyrighted material.
This element does not, however, give the copyright holder the
exclusive right to control all purchasing decisions made by the
consumer.
Although this fourth factor seldom weighs against Mashup Artists
due to the fact that the majority of Mashups are unlikely to be proven
44
as “market substitutes” for the original copyrighted material, the
wide array of judgments issued nationwide evidence that there is no

38. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 566.
39. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
40. Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 568 (citing Sony Corp. of Am. V. Universal Studios,
Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 451 (1984)).
41. Long, supra note 22, at 333.
42. Id. (citing Harper & Row, 471 U.S. at 567-69).
43. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1523– 24 (9th Cir. 1992).
44. Michael Allyn Pote, Mashed-Up in Between: The Delicate Balance of Artists’
Interests Lost Amidst the War on Copyright, 88 N.C. L. REV. 639, 690 (2010).
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single way this factor may be analyzed. 45 This judicial discrepancy is
due largely in part to the fact that the fourth factor is stated in such a
broad manner that it fails to inform courts as to whether emphasis
should be placed on the present or future market, and the amount of
attention that must be given to imaginary derivative works not yet
developed by the copyright holder.
The following two decisions rendered by the United States Court
of Claims and the Second Circuit provide an accurate example of
these contradictory viewpoints expressed by courts in assessing this
fourth factor. In Williams & Wilkins Co. v. United States, the United
States Court of Claims determined it would be wrong to “measure the
detriment to [the copyright holder] by loss of presumed royalty
46
income” from a non-existent future market, limiting the scope of this
fourth prong solely to the impact the appropriated work had on the
current market. Expressing a dramatically opposing viewpoint, the
Second Circuit, in Iowa State University Research Foundation, Inc. v.
47
American Broadcasting, evaluated the fourth factor in terms of
whether a future market and not-yet-developed derivative work
would suffer harm as a result of the appropriated work. In making
this evaluation, the court neglected to evaluate whether the copyright
48
holder had any intention to exercise his section 106 right to create a
derivative work from the copyrighted material.
Because of the disparity amongst the judicial system in evaluating
this element of fair use, it is inherently biased against Mashup
creators, as courts retain discretion to review the market effects that
an already developed Mashup may impose upon a derivative work
not even in existence. This comparison may be made even when the
original copyright holder has failed to demonstrate intent to create a
derivative work. Not only does this factor allow courts to consider
hypothetical derivative works in assessing the liability of a Mashup
Artist, but it also enables these courts to create hypothetical markets
composed of non-existent consumers and imaginary technologies, all
of which automatically give the original copyright holder the upper
hand in the fair use debate.

45. Haochen Sun, Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5 NW. J. TECH. &
INTELL. PROP. 265, 290 (2007).
46. 487 F.2d 1345, 1357 n.19 (Ct. Cl. 1973).
47. 621 F.2d 57, 62 (2d Cir. 1980).
48. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
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B. Problems With the Fair Use Doctrine as Applied to Mashups

With the emergence of social and video sharing-networks, the fair
use doctrine inadequately addresses concerns of Mashup Artists as it
49
treats Mashup Artists like enterprise-level pirates, is concerned with
protecting the commercial function of a work rather than securing a
50
composition’s social value, requires Mashup Artists to pay to defend
their work should it be challenged with an infringement claim—even
51
if their creation is non-commercial, and prevents Mashup Artists
from making a living, as they are is rarely able to sell their creations
52
without inviting threats of infringement from copyright holders. In
addition to this myriad of concerns, the fair use doctrine is outdated,
ambiguous, and disregards the legitimate social and political functions
Mashups serve in today’s society.
The fair use doctrine is outdated in that it fails to adequately
address the disconnect between “what current copyright law protects
and how people [presently] create” with the aid of modern
53
technology. No longer are consumers passive listeners; with the
emergence of the Web 2.0 phenomenon, users have started “taking
54
control of technology and making culture instead of consuming it.”
Modern day users crave innovation, communication and mass
networking, and strive to develop new ways to connect and obtain
55
control of technological advancements. In neglecting to impose a
provision specifically tailored to address this modern-day technology,
the fair use doctrine leaves the user’s interest in creation unprotected
and directly contravenes copyright’s intended purpose of
“encourag[ing] and reward[ing] the development of creative works
56
for the betterment of society.”
The fair use doctrine is ambiguous, as it neglects to provide
Mashup Artists with clear standards as to what may and may not be
57
As fair use is
considered ‘fair’ use under the Copyright Act.
49. Katz, supra note 6, at 38.
50. Debora Halbert, Mass Culture and the Culture of the Masses: A Manifesto for
User-Generated Rights, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 921, 954 (2009).
51. Katz, supra note 6, at 26.
52. See Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records, 780 F.Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y.
1991)(finding all unauthorized sampling legally suspect and susceptible to infringement
allegations).
53. Halbert, supra note 50, at 921.
54. Id. at 923.
55. Mark Dominiak, ‘Millenials’ Defying the Old Models; Younger Online Consumers
Leaning More Toward User-Generated Content, TELEVISION WK., May 7, 2007 at 68.
56. Katz, supra note 6, at 2.
57. See generally, Halbert, supra note 50.
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analyzed in a case-by-case manner, the Mashup Artist is neither
provided with information outlining the amount of work he may
appropriate, nor given a description of the specific elements of the
copyrighted work he may appropriate before he is automatically
deemed an infringer. This lack of uniformity is likely to stifle
innovation, as Mashup Artists may be less likely to create if they are
uncertain as to whether they will be charged with infringement upon
publication of their work. As user-generated creative works begin to
increase in popularity, the Copyright Act must adapt to provide the
Mashup Artist with a broader and more consistent level of protection.
The fair use doctrine disregards the legitimate social and political
functions Mashups serve in today’s society. Although viewed by the
majority of the entertainment industry as inherently destructive,
Mashups can and often do serve productive, socially desirable
purposes consistent with the Copyright Act, as they unite viewers
throughout the world, invite user commentary, welcome criticism,
and aid in the development of positive self-expression and self58
definition. Additionally, Mashups enhance First Amendment values
by fostering a safe outlet where society may “adopt, modify, reject
59
[and] question” copyrighted creations.

IV. Alternative Solutions to Fair Use
Due to the aforementioned flaws with the fair use doctrine as
applied to Mashups and the Web 2.0 phenomenon, a new mechanism
must be constructed to better balance the Mashup Artist’s right to
create with the copyright owner’s interest in profiting from his work.
In struggling to develop a system that achieves uniformity and
eliminates uncertainty within the Mashup community, copyright
theorists such as William W. Fisher, Brian Pearl, Pamela Samuelson,
Abigail De Kosnik, and Michael W. Carroll have proposed several
alternative systems for compensating copyright holders when Mashup
Artists use their copyrighted material in creating a new work. These
alternative systems are not exhaustive, but merely demonstrate the
wide range of recommendations made by copyright scholars to
restructure fair use. While these solutions may prove meritorious in
providing proper justice to either the Mashup Artist, consumer or
58. Jane C. Ginsburg, User-Generated Content Sites and Section 512 of the U.S.
Copyright Act in COPYRIGHT ENFORCEMENT AND THE INTERNET 183, 184 (2010),
available at http://lsr.nellco.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1084&context=columbia_pllt (last
visited Nov. 12, 2012).
59. Rebecca Tushnet, Hybrid Vigor: Mashups, Cyborgs, and Other Necessary
Monsters, 6 J. L. & POL’Y. INFO. SOC’Y. 1, 2 (2010).
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copyright holder, none of the following proposals adequately address
the concerns of all three, and each recommendation leaves many
important questions and concerns unanswered.
In his book, “Promises to Keep: Technology, Law and the Future
60
of Entertainment,” William W. Fisher, III outlines three alternative
solutions to better address the technological advances that have
developed as a result of the Web 2.0 phenomenon. Fisher’s primary
scheme, which he describes as designed “explicitly . . . to protect
61
creators, as a class, against injury,” recommends transforming the
entire copyright system into an administrative system resembling that
of an involuntary license. Under this theory, if a copyright owner
wanted to be compensated when a Mashup Artist used any quantity
of his copyrighted material, he would register his copyright with the
United States Copyright Office in advance and pay a designated fee
62
for the registration. Once the material was registered, the copyright
holder would receive a “unique file name, which . . . would be used to
63
track . . . distribution, consumption and modification” of the
copyrighted material. The government would then compensate the
copyright holder through taxes imposed on everyday entertainment
and electronic items such as MP3 players, cable boxes, and personal
computers after determining the “frequency with which each song
64
and film was listened to or watched.” The amount of compensation
a copyright holder would receive from tax money would be
commensurate with the rates in which the public interacted with the
65
registered work.
The main criticism of this proposal is that it would have a negative
impact on copyright holders and the consumer at large. Copyright
holders may not have the funds to register their works with the
Copyright Office, and those who are unable to do so are barred from
subsequently seeking compensation from the government when
another appropriates their work. Additionally, Fisher’s proposal
harms the public at large, as all consumers will be forced to pay a
designated tax on entertainment-related products. By imposing a
fixed tax for all, Fisher rewards those who rapidly consume
copyrighted materials, since they are not required to pay a tax equal
60. WILLIAM W. FISHER, III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE
FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 9, 199-258 (2004).
61. Id. at 249.
62. Id. at 203-06.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 223-34.
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to their amount of consumption, and punishes those who seldom
interact with copyrighted material, since they will be required to pay
the same amount in taxes as the avid consumer. Moreover, Fisher’s
proposal may cause a decline in the market for electronic goods, since
his tax can only be imposed on products that have not yet been
purchased, and users may delay in replacing an old computer solely
on the basis of the excessive entertainment tax.
In his 2009 UCLA Law Review proposal, “Girl Talk, Fair Use
66
and Three Hundred Twenty-Two Reasons for Copyright Reform,”
Brian Pearl advocates for imposing a compulsory licensing scheme
coupled with a royalty-based system. Under this mechanism, the
Mashup Artist would be obligated to compensate the copyright
holder based on the percentage of revenue generated by the Mashup
67
creation. If the Mashup Artist either uses multiple copyrighted
materials in one Mashup or creates a CD consisting of several tracks
comprised of multiple materials, he would be required to divide the
royalty fees paid to each copyright holder in proportion to the length
68
of the samples used on each track.
Although on its face, this method appears to be ideal, since
Mashup Artists who do not generate income from their works would
not be forced to pay anything for the use of the copyrighted material,
Pearl’s proposal fails to adequately address the copyright holder’s
69
concerns under section 106 of the Copyright Act, as it grants
Mashup Artists free-range to create an alleged ‘non-profit derivative
work’ and publish that work on the Internet for millions of people to
observe without having to compensate the copyright holder for its
70
use.
Throughout the course of her career, Pamela Samuelson, a
nationally recognized pioneer in the realms of digital copyright law,

66. Brian Pearl, Girl Talk, Fair Use and Three Hundred Twenty-Two Reasons for
Copyright Reform, N.Y.U. INTELL. PROP. & ENTM’T L. LEDGER 19 (2009) available at:
http://jipel.law.nyu.2009/12/girl-talk-fair-use-and-three-hundred-reasons-for-copyrightreform/.
67. Id. at 26-27.
68. Id. at 27-28.
69. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006).
70. See also, Viacom Int’l. Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 718 F.Supp.2d 514 (S.D. N.Y. 2010),
540 F.Supp.2d 461 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (Although this matter centered upon direct copies
being made of Viacom’s copyrighted content, Viacom distributed cease-and-desist letters
to Mashup Artists who published their not-for-profit works on YouTube’s video-sharing
network.).
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cyber law, and information policy, 71 and distinguished legal Professor
at the University of California, Berkeley, has written extensively on
modifying the 1976 Copyright Act to provide for a greater
understanding amongst the American people of the limitations
imposed by Copyright Law, particularly in the area of digital
72
Although each of Samuelson’s
downloads and technology.
proposals differs in structure, her overreaching theme remains the
same: the United States Copyright Office must refine its statutory
damages provision to ensure that due process considerations are
adequately accommodated, and to prevent those charged with
secondary liability in infringing the copyrighted material from being
73
assessed a penalty grossly disproportionate to their actual offense.
74
Under section 504(c) of the 1976 Copyright Act, when a copyright
holder has filed an infringement claim against someone who
appropriated his work without authorization to do so, he may elect to
75
recover an award of statutory damage in a sum of no less than $750.
Where the alleged infringer bears the burden of proof and must
demonstrate he was unaware his actions were infringing, the court
may “reduce the award of statutory damages to a sum of not less than
76
$200” should he prevail on his argument. As such, even if the court
finds the alleged infringer lacked reason to believe he committed
infringement, he is still subject to a $200 minimum fine, unless an
77
employment exception under sections (2)(i) and 2(ii) applies.
In arguing for a less arbitrary statutory damages provision,
Samuelson recommends courts look to the type of infringement that
occurred when awarding copyright statutory damages. For matters of
“innocent” infringement, where the alleged infringer did not believe
his actions constituted infringement, the defendant’s work was not for
profit, and the copyright holder suffered minimal damage, Samuelson
suggests courts automatically award the minimum amount of

71. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY, http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu
/~pam/ (last visited May 2, 2011).
72. Pamela Samuelson, Preliminary Thoughts on Copyright Reform, UNIVERSITY OF
CALIFORNIA, BERKELEY http://people.ischool.berkeley.edu/~pam/papers/Preliminary
%20Thoughts%20utah.pdf (last visited May 2, 2011).
73. Id. at 15.
74. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c) (2006).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(1) (2006).
76. 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2) (2006).
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)(i) (2006) and 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)(2)(ii) (2006) (carving
out circumstances where the court may remit statutory damages; examples include
employees of nonprofit educational institutions and public broadcasting entities).
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statutory damages. 78
For what she describes as “ordinary
79
infringement,” Samuelson urges courts to award statutory damages
in an amount commensurate with the amount of damages the original
copyright holder would have been awarded if he made no election to
80
seek statutory damages. In determining the amount of damages
under this type of infringement, Samuelson advises courts to ensure
actual damages are as accurately approximated as possible to prevent
infringers from being charged with overly-excessive damages
81
disproportionate to the amount of copyright material appropriated.
While the obvious benefit of Samuelson’s proposal is that it would
prevent infringers, such as Mashup Artists, from being excessively
penalized when they do not significantly profit from use of the
copyrighted material, it does so at the cost of automatically deeming a
Mashup Artist an infringer, and neglecting to carve out a “safe
harbor” mechanism in which one may appropriate another’s work
without being deemed in violation of the Copyright Act. Under
Samuelson’s proposal, Mashup Artists are no more protected than
they would be under the fair use doctrine, since infringement may
occur “when the [Mashup Artist] did not know his conduct was
82
infringing” and a Mashup Artist, even one who creates for noncommercial purposes, would be subject to compensating the
83
copyright holder a minimum of “$200.” This proposal also decreases
the likelihood of the judicial system establishing a level of consistency
amongst other factually similar cases, as she has failed to demonstrate
a precise measurement for courts to use when calculating damages.
As Mashups often neglect to serve as replacements of or substitutes
for the copyrighted material, it will become increasingly difficult for
the majority of copyright holders to give a near exact estimate of the
damages suffered, and courts will be forced penalize Mashup Artists
on a copyright holder’s mere conjecture of lost profits.
Copyright scholar and Assistant Professor at the University of
California, Berkeley, Abigail De Kosnik, identifies a two-fold

78. Pamela Samuelson et al., Statutory Damages in Copyright Law: A Remedy in
Need of Reform, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 439, 501 (2009).
79. Samuelson defines “ordinary infringers” as those who “knew they were infringing
or were reckless about infringing, but as to whom other indicia of egregious conduct are
not present.” Ordinary infringers may include those who use copyrighted material in a
commercial manner. Id. at 503.
80. Id. at 503.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 449 n. 35.
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approach in altering copyright law to accommodate for the increasing
impact re-mix culture imposes on present day society, particularly in
the area of fan-fiction. Although fan-fiction on its face may bear little
relation to a Mashup, the circumstances surrounding a fan-fiction
writer are similar to that of the Mashup Artist, as the fan-fiction
writer appropriates characters or a plot from a copyrighted work,
transforms them as he sees fit and submits his work for publication,
84
either in stores or via the Internet. De Kosnik’s analysis first
suggests re-mix artists should be required to compensate copyright
owners for use of their material before they are able to share their
85
new work with others via online publication. Second, De Kosnik
notes fans have compensated the re-mix artist for his work. Once the
re-mix artist has been compensated, De Kosnik suggests that he share
86
a percentage of these profits with the original copyright holder. The
percentage of shared profits would most likely be commensurate with
87
the percentage of the copyright material appropriated in the remix.
The primary concern with De Kosnik’s two-step analysis is that it
ignores imperative questions that must be addressed. Must all
Mashup Artists strive to receive a profit for their work? What if fans
refuse to compensate the Mashup Artist for his creation and he does
not profit; would he still be forced to pay the copyright holder for use
of the copyrighted material? Should the source where the Mashup
Artist posts his work be responsible for compensating him should fans
not take to his creation? Would doing so require video and filesharing networks to screen Mashup creations in order to determine if
they may prove profitable before the network may accept the Mashup
for online publication? Would Mashup Artists no longer strive to
create works if they are no longer able to work anonymously or under
a pseudonym?
In his 2007 North Carolina Law Review article entitled, “Fixing
88
Fair Use,” American University Washington College of Law
Professor Michael W. Carroll introduces three different ways to alter
copyright law and eliminate the uncertainty inherent in the fair use

84. Tushnet, supra note 59, at 3–4; See also, Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co.,
268 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2001).
85. Abigail De Kosnik, Should Fan Fiction Be Free? 4 J. SOC’Y CINEMA & MEDIA
STUD. 118, 120-21 (2009) (comparing digital appropriation with fan-fiction and
recommending compensating these artists in order to properly reimburse copyright
holders for use of their original works).
86. Id. at 121-23.
87. Id.
88. Michael W. Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (2007).
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doctrine. In his main proposal, Carroll recommends that Congress
alter the Copyright Act to permit development of a Fair Use Board
(hereinafter, “Board”) within the United States Copyright Office.
This three-judge administrative body would retain the exclusive right
to authorize the use of a copyrighted work in a creation, such as a
Mashup, without requiring the Mashup Artist compensate the
89
copyright owner for the specific use. Under this proposal, the
Mashup Artist would petition the Board for permission to use a
90
particular copyrighted work prior to creating the Mashup. In filing
his petition, the Mashup Artist would be required to notify the
copyright holder that a petition had been made and summarize his
request to use the particular work. The copyright holder would then
receive an opportunity to respond to the petition on the grounds of
his choosing, or file for a declaratory judgment, but the Board would
retain the sole discretion in determining whether a work may be
91
appropriated. Once a decision regarding the petition has been
made, the petitioner would be free from all liability for the proposed
use, but the copyright holder may challenge other artist’s similar uses
of the copyrighted material, as the Board’s ruling would be non92
precedential. Each Board decision would be appealable and subject
to administrative and judicial review.
There are three main concerns surrounding Carroll’s theory, all of
which prejudice the Mashup Artist in a significant way. First,
Carroll’s recommendation could be incredibly time-consuming for
both the Mashup Artist and the copyright holder, as the Board’s final
decision is appealable and both parties are given several
opportunities to file motions outlining their arguments. By the time a
verdict has been rendered in the Mashup Artist’s favor, he may no
longer be interested in using the work, as its social value may have
depreciated since the filing of his petition.
Second, because the copyright holder is likely to have more of a
disposable income than the Mashup Artist, particularly in
circumstances where the copyright is held by a major corporation, the
Mashup Artist will likely be forced to obtain legal counsel in order to
successfully prevail against the copyright holder’s legal team.
Assuming the Board initially renders a decision in the Mashup
Artist’s favor and the copyright holder exercises his right to appeal,

89. Id. at 1090.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1091.
92. Id.
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the Mashup Artist may have expended several thousand dollars in
obtaining legal advice for the opportunity to use one minute of
copyrighted material before the matter is settled.
Third, Carroll’s theory fails to distinguish the casual Mashup
Artist, an individual who creates his work merely for personal
satisfaction, from the commercial Mashup Artist, an individual who
may use the copyrighted material to create compact disks for
worldwide sale and distribution. Both types of Mashup Artist would
be required to file a petition with the Board requesting permission to
use the copyrighted material. Both would likely obtain legal counsel
to assist them in presenting their arguments and both would be
subject to thousands of dollars in legal fees should they need
assistance in preparing their claim.

V. Proposal for Reform
In order to best promote uniformity amongst Mashup cases and
adequately balance concerns of the Mashup Artist, consumer and
copyright holder, this article outlines a two-step proposal of what
must occur. First, Congress must impose strict requirements that
social and video-sharing networks (hereinafter, “network(s)”) must
follow before they may broadcast a user’s creation. Second, Congress
must alter the Copyright Act to include a four-tiered matrix
specifically designed to address those who develop video or audio
works comprised of two or more segments of pre-existing copyrighted
material for personal use, distribution on the Internet, or profit.
A. Regulating the Internet

Congress must establish a series of requirements that social and
video-sharing websites must meet before they are permitted to accept
a user’s creation for publication. Due to the lax regulation of the
Internet, litigation of infringement claims has become rampant in
present-day society, as those who wish to upload works consisting of
copyrighted material are able to do so with ease and at virtually little
to no cost. While websites such as YouTube require those who
upload work onto their networks (hereinafter, “up-loaders”) to
establish an online user account before they may publish a work, uploaders are not required to submit any personal information aside
from postal code, gender and date of birth, and there is nothing
preventing them from establishing their online accounts with
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inaccurate information. 93 Further, up-loaders are not asked specific
questions about the work they intend to publish, and are merely
required to check “I accept” under a series of statements informing
them that their account will be deleted if material they do not
94
personally own is uploaded. Because these networks neglect to
record personal information from the up-loader and fail to obtain
specific details about the work being uploaded, they become a virtual
un-regulated breeding ground for copyright violators; anyone can
post anything without a likelihood of facing liability, as it is often
time-consuming and difficult for copyright owners to browse
databases searching for violations.
To assist in bringing these networks back to their main purpose of
providing society with an outlet to share their own creations, but still
presenting an arena where works such as Mashups may be shared
worldwide, Congress should require that all video-sharing networks
make a more detailed assessment of the user and the type of work
created before allowing for publication. Under this system, when
establishing a user account, the up-loader must submit personal
information similar to that required if he were making an online
purchase. His name, address, telephone number, and credit card
number would all be required and privately maintained by the social
or video-sharing network. This information would not be available to
the public, and the up-loader would be permitted to establish the
username or pseudonym of his choice under which his creations
would be published.
Aside from the up-loader’s personal information, the network
would also be required to gather data particularly related to the
content being uploaded. After an up-loader accurately submits his
personal information with the network, he would be directed to a
second series of questions where he would be asked if his work uses
material created by another. If it does use such material, the uploader would be required to submit the name and creator of the
material being appropriated along with the amount (in minutes) of
each appropriated work. If an up-loader submits false information
under the first set of questions, he would not be directed to the
second set. If he submits false information on the second set of
93. Create a New Google Account, GOOGLE, http://accounts.google.com/
SignUp?service=youtube (last visited May 2, 2012).
94. Copyright Tips, GOOGLE, http://www.youtube.com/t/howto_copyright (last
visited May 2, 2011). (YouTube tells users before they create an account, “Uploading
materials that you do not own is a copyright violation and against the law. If you upload
material you do not own, your account will be deleted.”).
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questions and states his work does not contain material appropriated
by another when it actually does, his credit card would automatically
be charged $200, half of which would go to the artist(s) whose work is
appropriated, while the other half is paid to the particular network.
These requirements would enable the network to compile a
database of works uploaded so that they would be able to compensate
the copyright owner directly from the up-loader’s account
commensurate with the fees established under the four-tiered matrix
described in section B of this proposal.
Although critics may urge that imposing such strict requirements
on the up-loader may prevent users from uploading information onto
video-sharing networks, in theory it does the exact opposite.
Presently, all video-sharing networks do not allow one to post the
copyrighted work of another; anyone who uploads another’s
copyrighted material will automatically lose their account, and their
creation, once identified by network representatives, will be
95
removed. Under the proposed regulation, the amount of works
permissibly uploaded to these sharing networks would dramatically
increase, as users would be able to upload copyrighted and noncopyrighted information without the fear of having their account and
posting removed, or facing thousands of dollars in litigation costs.
This theory is also consistent with the fundamental aim of copyright
law to further progress, as all creators will be able to use videosharing networks specifically tailored to their individual creations.
Further, imposing regulations on these social networks does not
remove a Mashup Artist’s right to remain anonymous in publication,
as viewers of the uploaded content do not receive any information
about its creator other than the information which the artist wishes to
display. Additionally, this restriction does not inhibit creation or
punish those who do not choose to upload material copyrighted by
another, as users who upload works that are entirely theirs will not be
required to pay an uploading fee.
B. Imposition of a Four-Tiered Matrix

In order to determine the amount of compensation copyright
holders are entitled to receive for unauthorized use of their
copyrighted materials in Mashups, Congress must create a scheme
that acknowledges the numerous types of Mashup creations and
provides a uniform method to adequately and evenly compensate
copyright holders.
95.

Id.
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The only way for copyright law to achieve this delicate balance is
for Congress to create a four-tiered matrix within the Copyright Act
that will particularly pertain to Mashups as defined in section II(A) of
this article. The matrix would be structured in the shape of a
pyramid, and each of the four tiers would be separated based on the
type and location of infringement. Based on the type and location of
infringement that has occurred, a Mashup Artist may not be required
to compensate the original holder for use of the copyrighted material,
or he may be forced to share a percentage of his profits proportionate
to the amount earned or quantity of work appropriated.
The first tier is designed specifically to protect the “CasualMasher;” an individual who creates a work for his own pleasure using
two or more copyrighted materials, does not publish his creation on
the Internet or on any other social-video sharing platform, and
receives no profit from his compilation. This Masher may share his
works with friends or even display it in a large setting, such as a
lecture or banquet hall, but neither he nor anyone else may publish or
profit from the creation. If a Mashup Artist’s work falls within this
tier, the original copyright holder automatically would be barred from
seeking damages and alleging infringement.
For example, Jim, a “Casual Masher,” creates a six-minute
Mashup of scenes from various Walt Disney and Pixar films that he
shows to his family and friends at a local coffee shop. Jim does not
get paid for this work, and he has not posted it online. Under the first
tier of the matrix, Jim’s use of the copyrighted material would
automatically be presumed “fair.” As such, Jim is automatically
protected from all liability and is not required to compensate either
Disney or Pixar for his use of the copyrighted materials.
The second and third tiers of the matrix resemble the mechanical
licensing requirement established in section 115 of the 1976 Copyright
96
Act, as they require the Mashup Artist compensate the copyright
holder based on the amount of work appropriated.
Dedicated to the “Low-Scale-Masher,” the second tier of the
proposal applies to the individual who creates a work for his own
pleasure using two or more copyrighted materials, publishes that
work on social or video sharing platforms that are privately funded
and do not contain advertisements, and receives no profit from his

96. 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2006) (Establishing a compulsory license for those who make
and distribute physical and digital phonorecords. Users must compensate the copyright
holder at a current rate of 9.1 cents or 1.75 cents per minute of playing time or fraction
thereof, whichever is greater.).
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compilation. Under this tier, a “Low-Scale-Masher” who falls within
the above definition must compensate the copyright holder in a sum
proportionate to the amount of copyrighted work appropriated at a
rate of three cents per minute. This charge will be made directly to or
taken from the credit card or bank account the Mashup Artist listed
when he developed his user account with the online network. This
modest cost addresses the needs of both the Mashup Artist and the
copyright holder, as the Mashup Artist will be able to publish his
work at little cost, and the copyright holder, even if he does not suffer
detriment, will be compensated for the use of his creation. Personal
homepages would automatically fall within this tier.
The third tier is relatively similar to the second, only it pertains to
the “Mid-Scale-Masher,” one who creates a work for his own
pleasure using two or more copyrighted materials, publishes that
work on social or video sharing platforms that are funded by
consumers or advertisements or a combination of both, and receives
no profit from his compilation. A “Mid-Scale-Masher” who meets
these requirements would be required to compensate the copyright
holder in a sum proportionate to the amount of copyrighted work
appropriated at a rate of six cents per minute. Like the charges made
to the “Low-Scale-Masher’s” user account, the fees a “Mid-ScaleMasher” must pay would be directly charged to or taken from the
account on file with the video-sharing network. Networks that would
automatically fall in this tier would include YouTube, Blip.tv, and
Yahoo Video. All video-sharing networks that offer both a fee and
no-fee version for viewers would also be included within this tier.
Putting the second and third tiers into practice with assistance
from the hypothetical created in tier one, imagine Jim decides to post
his Disney/Pixar Mashup on the Internet and that two of the six
minutes consist of Disney footage, while the remaining four minutes
are copyrighted by Pixar. Depending on where Jim chooses to
publish his work, he may be responsible for paying Disney and Pixar
either 6 and 8 cents respectively, (if he publishes the work on his
personal homepage), or 12 and 16 cents respectively (if he wishes to
post the work on YouTube), for use of the copyrighted material.
Either way, the Mashup Artist is not likely to be deterred by the low
cost in publishing his work, the consumer is able to view his creation,
and the copyright holder is able to receive compensation.
The final tier pertains directly to the “High-Scale-Masher,” one
who directly profits financially from his work. There are two types of
Mashup Artists that fall within this category. The first type of
Mashup Artist is known as the “One-Track-Masher,” who creates a
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single Mashup that he sells for profit. Throughout his career, he may
create hundreds of Mashups, but the “One-Track-Masher” sells each
Mashup separately as a single track. Under this fourth tier, if a “OneTrack-Masher” receives funds for the sale of his Mashup, he would be
required to compensate each copyright holder at a rate of two percent
of the gross profits received. This two percent restriction could
legitimately require the Mashup Artist to relinquish all profits if he
were to use more than fifty works in his creation. However, it is the
superior alternative to requiring him to pay based on the proportion
of copyrighted materials appropriated, since the Mashup Artist will
only have to compensate the copyright holder if his work profits. The
second type of “High-Scale-Masher” is the “Multiple-Masher,” an
97
artist such as DJ Girl Talk, who creates several different Mashups,
separates these Mashups into individual tracks, and compiles them
onto one compact disk or record, which he sells for profit. Each of
DJ Girl Talk’s albums contains samples from over hundreds of
98
copyrighted materials. Instead of requiring the “Multiple-Masher”
to distribute two percent of his profits to over a hundred different
copyright holders, he would be required to compensate the copyright
holder in proportion to the length of copyrighted material used at a
fixed rate of ten cents per minute per copy sold. If DJ Girl Talk uses
twenty minutes of a copyrighted song in his album and sells 200
copies of the album, he would be required to compensate the
99
copyright holder $400.
The difference in regulation between the “Multiple-Masher” and
“One-Track-Masher” serves as recognition of the various Mashing
methods available, and ensures that Mashup Artists are not grossly
financially burdened in a manner disproportionate to the amount of
copyrighted material appropriated.
Overall, this four-tiered Matrix is an ideal and uniform means of
regulating Mashups, as it adequately addresses the needs of the
Mashup Artist, consumer, and copyright holder in an un-biased and
predictable manner without inhibiting the First Amendment goals
100
and historical aims of copyright law. It satisfies the concerns within
the Mashup community, as it provides clear guidelines as to the
amount of compensation a Mashup Artist must furnish to copyright
97. Pearl, supra note 66.
98. Id.
99. 10 cents per minute x 20 minutes of copyrighted material = $2 must be paid to the
copyright holder per album; $2 per album x 200 albums sold = $400 must be paid to the
copyright holder.
100. Halbert, supra note 50, at 953 (2009).
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holders in creating his work, and it eliminates the uncertainty
101
prevalent within today’s Mashup community. It is also malleable,
and alters in form to recognize the various types of Mashups that may
be created and the various locations where they may be published.
Further, it eliminates the fair use doctrine’s present bias in favor of
102
commercial interests and makes copyright law more amenable to
technological advancements without ignoring the needs and rights of
copyright holders. It also recognizes the needs of consumers in a
manner unlike any other proposal, as it allows for online publication
of all works- not just those original to the up-loader, without imposing
a mandatory or blanket tax. Finally, it is an ideal proposal for
copyright holders, as they are able to receive guaranteed
compensation for the published use of their copyrighted material,
even when the Mashup Artist does not profit from his creation.
Critics of this proposal may urge that a statutory licensing scheme
like that reflected within the proposed Matrix would be impractical,
as the majority of Mashup Artists create works for non-commercial
purposes and would be forced to either cease creating works or go
into debt in order to pursue their interest in developing Mashups.
This concern is outweighed by the first tier of the Matrix, which
grants the “Casual Masher” full discretion to use the copyrighted
work as he deems fit, so long as his creation is not published and he
does not profit from its creation. Further, the small fees Mashup
Artists will have to pay to use copyrighted material in a manner
outlined in tiers two and three of the Matrix are not significant
enough to deter the increase of Mashup creations.
Another criticism of the proposal is that current Mashups located
on the Internet would not be subject to this Matrix, while future
works would be. This is certainly not the case, as the proposed
scheme would require that every video-sharing network entirely wipe
their online database and only accept works once they have reformatted their user account registration process consistent with
section V(A) of this proposal. This way, every up-loader has
completed the necessary registration process, and is aware of their
obligations to compensate copyright holders should their work
include material that is not their own. Although wiping entire
databases may prove time-consuming and costly to video-sharing
networks, these networks have historically skirted around liability as
secondary infringers, solely on the basis that they did not post the
101. Id. at 954.
102. Id.
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infringing material or have a belief that a particular posting contained
infringing material. It is certainly time they take responsibility and
facilitate compliance with copyright laws.

VI. Conclusion
In order for copyright law to remain prevalent in today’s
primarily digital world, it must be altered to foster, not inhibit
creativity. Mashup Artists and their creations are different from
those who commit acts of pure digital piracy, yet current copyright
law under the fair use doctrine fails to treat them as such. In order to
balance the inherent conflict between free speech, creativity, and the
law, Congress must adapt the Copyright Act and bridge the gap
103
between what the law protects and how people create. The only
way to bridge this gap and accommodate the creator, consumer, and
copyright holder is to impose heightened requirements on social and
video-sharing networks and develop a matrix specifically tailored to
assess all matters pertaining to this new way of creating. The twentyfirst century is moving forward with or without copyright law. ‘It is
only fair that copyright follow suit.
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